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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
From a broad perspective the aerospace manufacturing and service value chain covers 
airlines delivering value to the passenger through the provision of seats, through the 
airframer OEM, engine OEM and supply chains that cover both the provision of OE and the 
aftermarket spare parts and services. The aim of this report is to highlight and discuss some 
of the issues that exist within this value chain. In attempting this, the business model 
operated within each tier of the value chain is modelled and discussed, with specific 
reference made to how this may exert influence performance of the Aero-engine 
manufacturer. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
This deliverable forms part of a series of three deliverables which give understanding into 
what is a business model, and decision making aspects which need to be included when 
defining a business model (D2.1.2_1), how business models are applied in non-aerospace 
industries (D2.1.2_3) and this document, which examines and describes the business 
models evident within the aerospace industry. 
The evolution of the aerospace industry is unique amongst other industry, insofar as 
competition has been significantly manipulated and controlled by domestic governments 
rather than being left to free market economics. International air travel has traditionally been 
a highly protected and regulated industry which has only recently started to transform into an 
open and competitive marketplace. Evidence of this is most obvious at the airline operator 
level, with the national flag carrier being an example, but protection is evident throughout the 
value chain and the effects of ongoing protection have significantly influenced the current 
strategies and business models in place.  
This deliverable aims to describe some of this complexity. The focus of WP2.1 is the 
extended jet engine enterprise scenario, and this document examines each echelon of the 
extended enterprise and describes the structure of the relationship, the predominant 
business model adopted between companies, and how this may be influenced by future 
changes in the market place. Figure 1 is included to help understand the structure of this 
document. 
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Figure 1. Document Structure 
In describing business relationships it is important that a common understanding of a 
business model is in place. The business model concept is frequently associated with the dot 
com boom of the 90s, where companies exploited new technologies to find alternative 
methods to charge customers and earn on-going revenue. However, D2.1.2_1 demonstrated 
that the business model has far more complexity than the financial aspect, and can in fact, 
may be understood as the a description of how a business strategy will be translated into 
activities and operations (Olofsson & Farr, 2006). D2.1.2_1 highlighted the business model 
ontology by Osterwalder (2004) as a suitable method that could be used in building 
conceptual maps for business models. This subsequently allows for comparison and 
discussion. Shown in Figure 2, the ontology consists of 9 elements that are constituent parts 
of a business model. Mapping and describing key features of a company business model 
under each of these elements is the first stage in understanding and formalising the business 
model; if this can subsequently lead to increased understanding of how strategy is 
implemented, it could provide a basis for interpreting the effects of the likely evolution of the 
industry. Thus, this deliverable will use the ontology to compare and discuss business 
models within the aerospace industry. 
 
Figure 2 Business model ontology, the Osterwalder systems map of business model 
elements Osterwalder (2004). 
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The definition of a business model given by Osterwalder (2004) is: 
“…a conceptual tool that contains a set of elements and their relationships and allows 
expressing a company’s logic of earning money. It is a description of the value a company 
offers to one or several segments of customer and the architecture of the firm and its network 
of partners for creating, marketing and delivering this value and relationship capital in order 
to generate profitable and sustainable revenue streams.” 
This definition is discussed in detail in D2.1.2_1 (Olofsson and Farr, 2006) but in principle 
this description, which has been adopted by the project team, provides a model for 
describing how a business commercialises a product leading to the generation of profitable 
revenue. This is the definition used within this document to discuss industry business 
models. 
3. REGULATORY BODIES & AIRLINES 
The aviation industry is significantly influence by regulatory bodies. These bodies exert 
power over and affect almost all aspects of the airline business model, and in turn, this is felt 
throughout the industry value chain. 
As examples, regulators and government have influence over the following business areas: 
Environmental regulation. Examples include emission quotas, carbon emissions and noise. 
Significantly, regulators (and ultimately the OEMs) often have to balance conflicting aims, for 
example achieving noise reduction leads to an increase in the CO2 emissions.  
Taxation and financial regulation. As well as affecting the administrative requirements of the 
organisation, government regulation can affect the attitude towards investment, an example 
being rules towards asset value write down, this may lead to a predisposition for replacing kit. 
An example would be Singapore’s accounting rules allowing aircraft to be written off over 10 
years so providing an environment where owning and trading assets can significantly 
improve an airlines financial position. 
Company ownership & route deregulation. Privatisation and limits on subsidies have been a 
trend of the recent history of the European aviation industry (Gagnepain & Marin, 2006). This 
leads to efforts to improve efficiency and when combined with route deregulation increasing 
competitive pressures.  
Company protection. Company protection laws include examples such as the US’ Chapter 
11, which provides government protection from bankruptcy whilst a restructuring programme 
can be put in place. These affect the market by artificially preventing the natural balance of 
supply and demand. Where a failing company enters Chapter 11, the over-capacity which is 
likely to have led to this situation is not removed from the system and therefore continues the 
imbalance.  
4. AIRLINES & AIRFRAMER 
Doganis (2005) identifies three principle business models for Airlines:  
the traditional airline business model;  
the virtual airline; and  
the aviation business group.  
These distinctions are recognised by Rolls-Royce and therefore it is appropriate to use these 
as the framework in the following sections where each business model will be discussed in 
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turn. Towards to end of this section, how the airline business model influences the Airline and 
engine OEM is discussed.  
4.1. THE ‘TRADITIONAL’ AIRLINE 
Using the Osterwalder ontology, the business model is described in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Traditional airline model. 
Examples of airlines operating this business model include British Airways, Delta and Iberia. 
The business model of a traditional airline has been heavily influenced by historical 
associations with national governments and is likely to have previously been a privatised 
national flag carrier. Customer value is generated through offering customer a regular 
scheduled service to major hubs which give access to through flights and access to a large 
network of routes. Flying on a traditional airline, the customer will have higher levels of 
customer expectation concerning the service they will receive, meals and in flight 
entertainment are minimums as well as taking responsibility for any delays or cancellations. 
All of this costs the airline money which must be generated by ticket sales revenue or 
through the carriage of cargo. 
To operate the business model, the airline will have a large number of partnerships. Firstly, 
giving customers access to a large routes network through a single booking point can only be 
provided through alliances with other airlines. An example is the star alliance which has 18 
airlines cooperating on code sharing, joint marketing etc., to ensure that the passenger can 
book a complex point to point journey through a single airline, even if this requires a number 
of legs on different alliance members. The alliances can also act to create a long-term 
relationship with the customer through frequent flyer programmes, where points can be 
accrued with each flight with any of the alliance members and passengers rewarded with free 
flights or perks such as access to airport lounges and discounts on car hire. 
Historically, operationally, the business model is mainly self-contained, with little outsourcing 
of support services such as catering or maintenance, which will all be carried out by airline 
staff. However, more and more are now divesting themselves due to the successes of the 
virtual airline. This provides the economies of scale needed to provide an economically 
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optimal solution, but can lead to risk through the necessity to deal effectively with contractor 
and partners which influence customer value. An example of where this did not work is the 
BA / Gate Gourmet crisis of 2005 where errors made in the contract management process 
significantly influence the passenger experience (Newall, 2006).   
4.2. THE VIRTUAL AIRLINE 
The virtual airline is the most popular for new airlines. This growth is significant and has been 
stimulated in Europe with increased deregulation of the market, and a rise of concepts such 
as ‘open skies’ which allows for greater competition on routes. Currently, there are 
approximately 50 budget airlines operating the virtual airline model, with the majority of these 
airlines being less than 10 years old (Rogers, 2004).The business model is shown in figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Low cost carrier business model. 
The obvious examples of a virtual airline are Ryanair and Easyjet. As the name suggests the 
value proposition of the virtual airline model are the exceptional low prices available, with 
Ryanair suggesting that it may be able to offer flights for free in forthcoming years and 
revenue from other in flight services can offset the price of the ticket.  
The exceptionally low flight cost is achieved through two main mechanisms, tight control of 
operating costs and the removal of ‘no-cost to customer’ frills associated with the traditional 
airline business model. Items such as in flight meals and drinks incur a cost on a Ryanair 
flight. virtual airline are very aware of their core capability, being operating the flight, ticket 
sales and attracting customer. As such, many support services handled internally by the 
traditional airline business model will be outsourced. This achieves three objectives: 
High visibility of support service costs at the ‘market rate’. If a service provider is found to be 
expensive, then an alternative can be found; 
Outsourcing allows these to be incurred as variable rather than fixed costs. This flexibility can 
then be used to closely follow peaks and troughs in demand; 
The airline’s own costs are then clearly visible which aids aggressive management.  
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As the value proposition does not include in-flight services, such as meals and in flight 
entertainment, then these become an additional source of revenue from the customer.  
Outsourcing is adopted to ensure that costs are tightly controlled. Easyjet and Ryanair tend 
to use a tender process (perhaps as frequently as annually or bi-annually) to ensure good 
competition from the market place. By regularly reviewing pricing and service options and 
potentially changing supplier frequently means that partnerships and collaboration are 
difficult to establish through a evolutionary build-up of trust. As such virtual airlines must have 
excellent contract management teams to ensure that 3rd party contractors provide the support 
needed to build customer value. Effective partnership management, particularly in managing 
communication and interfaces is therefore required to ensure that all the companies involved 
work effectively together.  
An area where partnerships are less important than for traditional airlines is in reaching the 
customer. The virtual airline sells direct through the internet or call centers, and only sells 
direct flights on their own routes. Therefore, the value proposition of the virtual airline differs 
from that of the traditional airline business model and as such, at least initially, the virtual 
airline appealed to a different set of the customers, increasing the total amount of 
passengers rather than pinching them from competition. However, with the boom in air travel, 
business travelers used the virtual airline option for leisure flights which has influenced the 
price expectation of customers (Doganis, 2005). Ultimately, this has eroded the market share 
of traditional airlines as customer began to realize that the better service is not worth the 
extra cash. 
In the most recent downturn, this business model showed a level of robustness unusual for 
the cyclical aviation industry. Whilst traditional airlines struggled, particularly in the US, low-
cost airlines such as EasyJet and Ryanair continued to show profit. This suggests that the 
greater flexibility built into the virtual airline model creates a more robust business; the virtual 
airline can adjust more rapidly to changes in the market place. 
With the obvious success of the business model, Traditional Flag carriers have often sought 
to imitate the model with various levels of success. Examples include KLM & Buzz, and Air 
Canada & Zip. This has two benefits to the carrier, firstly the carrier is entering the low cost 
market, and therefore tapping into potential new sources of revenue, and secondly by 
transferring aircraft and staff to the new virtual airline operation, overcapacity and excess 
costs which may be caused, in part,through the success of the virtual airline, can also be 
transferred improving the finances of the traditional airline (Graf, 2005). However, problems 
are encountered when one business attempts to operate two mismatching business models. 
For example, the new working practices needed in order to be a successful virtual airline are 
difficult to apply to existing unionised employees.  
4.3. AVIATION BUSINESS GROUPS 
The final example for discussion is the aviation business group. An example of an airline 
operating this business model would be Lufthansa or Singapore Airlines.  The business 
model is described using the Osterwalder ontology in figure 5. 
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Figure 5. The business model of the aviation group business model 
The aviation business group business model, from the customer perspective, may not appear 
significantly different to that of a traditional airline. Sales are through a combination of 
websales and travel agents, and these airlines still concentrate on the business traveller 
section of the market. However, the aviation business groups have broadened the range of 
industry services on offer to create additional sources of revenue. These business groups 
target other airlines as potential customer in addition to selling seats on flight and cargo 
space.  
The opportunity to provide aviation services to other airlines has come about as a result of 
outsourcing, predominantly from airlines operating the virtual airline model. These business 
aviation groups can therefore use their own maintenance operating and ground crews for the 
support of other airlines, which allows this aspect of the airline operation to generate positive 
cash flow rather than being a cost in the traditional airline business model. 
4.4. WHICH IS BEST? 
It is difficult to rate the success of each business model, however, data provided by Rolls-
Royce, collated from freely available resources, gives an interesting trend. Figure 6 
compares financial performance with an indicator of the business model (the MRO index, a 
measure of MRO capability, the higher the MRO capability the more integrated the company 
and the lower the level of outsourcing). 
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Figure 6. Financial performance of airlines (Rolls-Royce, 2005) 
The trend evident is that financial performance varies with the MRO index, with the best 
performance being achieved at either end of the scale, either those companies handling no 
MRO internally (virtual airline) or those offering the full range of services (business aviation 
groups).  
Clearly, it is therefore possible to infer that the company operating a traditional business 
model struggles to remain competitive; the successful companies are adopting either a 
strategy of cost reduction, moving to the virtual airline model or becoming aviation business 
groups which increase revenues by finding new services that can be offered to other airlines. 
Generating profit solely from ticket revenues is difficult to do without lowering the cost based 
significantly. 
4.5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AIRLINE BUSINESS MODEL FOR THE AIRFRAMER & ENGINE 
OEM 
The business model for the OEM will be discussed in detail in Sections 5 and 6. However, 
there is a clear link between how airline choose to structure their businesses and how the 
OEM will generate revenue that it is appropriate to discuss now.  
The virtual airline model focuses on cost control and core capabilities, and therefore for the 
OEM, whereas the traditional airline and the business aviation groups focus on reaching a 
number of markets with a broad range of services. However, it is not clear that the business 
model adopted by the airline currently has a tangible influence on the business model of the 
engine OEM. Briefly (as these will be discussed more fully later in the document) the OEM 
receives customer revenue through the sale of engines and the sale of aftermarket support 
and consumables. The predominant business models are either to make margin on the 
engine, or to use the aftermarket (through long term service agreements) to cross-subsidise 
a discounted engine price. The decision for the airline between how they structure the deal 
with the engine OEM is a balance between the price (either upfront or ongoing) between the 
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risk of owning the engine, the ongoing costs and the potential benefits of economies of scale 
and simplification. These decisions are comparable regardless of the airline business model. 
However, implicitly, aviation business groups offer a broad range of MRO operations 
themselves, and provide these services to a broad range of airline customers. As such, 
although they are customers to the OEM for the original equipment, these airlines also act as 
competitors in the providing services to the aftermarket.  
The sales strategy adopted by the OEM must also account for risk. As the price of the engine 
is discounted risk is transferred to the aftermarket and as such the engine OEM has a 
tangible stake in ensure the engine stays on wing and operational. 
As previously mentioned the virtual airline model focuses on excellent contract management 
and an area where there is evidence that this had influenced the engine OEM is the size of 
the deal negotiated. Ryanair and Easyjet have both conducted competitions for the supply of 
100 aircraft within a single deal. As such this presents the opportunity for the airline to 
negotiate significant discounts and guarantees. With this trend, the customer mix changes for 
the OEM. Previously many deals will have been completed for a large number of airlines and 
a relatively small number of engines. With the virtual airline model, the potential is for a 
smaller number of customers, with far greater buying power and large deals being done.  
5. AIRFRAMER & ENGINE OEM 
In the market for large civil engines there are six Engine OEMs for Airbus and Boeing engage 
with.  Rolls-Royce, General Electric and Pratt and Whitney being the three prime 
manufacturers and their joint venture (JV) partnerships on IAE (RR, PW, MTU and JAEC), 
CFMi (GE and Snecma) and the Engine Alliance (GE and PW). 
The formation of JVs gives an indication of how difficult it can be to justify the size of 
investment required to create an engine programme and also how the changing political map 
within the industry creates windows of opportunity where companies form alliances where 
normally they would be competing head on. JVs reduce the absolute return for an individual 
partner but will reduce the investment required as well. JVs can also reduce the risk of not 
being selected on a particular airframe where partners are unsure whether they are 
creditable on a standalone basis. 
Historically, engine manufacturers have developed engines in isolation of the airframe 
application but with gas turbine technology moving from revolutionary to evolutionary it has 
become increasingly important to integrate the power plant design with that of the airframe. 
By integrating the powerplant design airframers can maximise the benefits of new technology 
and increase the performance gap between any new aircraft and its predecessors. 
The relationship between engine performance and aircraft performance is so closely linked 
now that the engine forms a disproportionate amount of the savings generated by a new 
design. An engine’s design and the knock-on through life cost become significant cost drivers 
for operators and can significantly influence the competitiveness of a particular airframe. This 
reliance on engine performance creates an unusual relationship between airframer and 
engine OEM and also onward to the operator. 
The commercial relationship between the airframer, engine OEM and operator becomes a 
three way relationship rather than the expected operator to airframer, airframer to engine 
OEM. The engine OEM sells installed engines to the airframer who then sells the complete 
airframe/engine package (the aircraft) to the operator. However, the operator negotiates with 
both the airframer and engine company to secure concessions against the list price of the 
aircraft. In competitions between types of airframe there may be a significant price 
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competition where pressure is brought on both the airframer and engine OEM. Once the 
airframe choice has been made a further engine competition may ensue where the engine 
OEMs compete to secure their position driving the concessions higher. 
With multiple combinations of airframe and engine combinations where there are 3, 2 or sole 
source engine choices, very different relationships arise between airframer and engine 
OEMs. An example of this would be the difference between the Airbus and Rolls-Royce 
relationship on the A330 and A340 programmes. 
The A330 relationship may prove to be the last of the traditional engine competitions where 
an operator has the choice of three different suppliers for its engines. In this case Airbus has 
little tie-in with the engine companies and as the competing 777 aircraft is also available with 
three engine choices the market is in a state of relative equilibrium. In this case no single 
engine price should affect the airframer’s ability to sell it aircraft and competition law prevents 
an engine manufacturer from offering more favourable concessions against one airframer’s 
product than the others. 
The A340 relationship shows how polarised the relationship can get. Rolls-Royce provides 
the only engine for the A340 which competes against the long range variants of the 777 
powered exclusively by GE. In this market the partner style relationship means that to be 
competitive each airframer and engine manufacturer needs to cooperate. In this case the 
engine price agreed with the customer directly impacts the airframers ability to sell its product 
unlike airframes that have a choice of engine whether competition between the engine 
manufacturers help relieve some of the commercial pressure from the airframer. 
In other markets a slightly different commercial relationship exists. Primarily on smaller 
aircraft the airframe manufacturer usually has a supply contract with an engine company with 
the price agreed in advance. This may be for engine sets when required or may take the form 
of batch orders for multiple ship sets. The airframer is then free to market the aircraft 
deciding how much concession to give independent of the relationship with the engine OEM. 
The engine OEM may have a relationship with the customer for in-service support but is not 
generally involved with the aircraft sale. 
There are many variations of the relationships described above each being formed around a 
particular set of circumstances and market pressures. At the start of each new programme 
these relationships are remodelled so creating even more diversity in the relationship. 
Based on this discussion a description of the business model operated between the engine 
OEM and the Airframer is shown in figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Business model for OEM – Airframer tier 
6. ENGINE OEM & 1ST TIER SUPPLY CHAIN 
The nature of civil aerospace projects creates challenges within the supply chain unseen by 
other industrial sectors. Programmes are complicated by the nature of the solutions and 
heavily regulated to maintain acceptable safety levels, while the price of the assets and costs 
of the development programmes need to be written of over a long period of time, sometimes 
more than 25 or even 40 years. These challenges have shaped the nature of the 
relationships within the supply chain over the past decades. 
The passage of time has seen an evolution in thinking in supply chain relationships. 
Originally, “arms-length” style relationships where a manufacturer would approach a supplier 
to make a few parts to their design were the only approach. This meant the OEM retained 
most risks with few risks shared with the supplier, the primary one being the ability of the 
supplier to deliver on time. The short-term nature of the relationship gave limited scope for 
any supplier to invest in improving costs or techniques as the manufacturer could change 
suppliers regularly and at will. 
As complexity and costs increased different relationships with the supply chain offered lower 
costs and risks. Long-term agreements (LTAs) gave suppliers security of tenure in exchange 
for lower prices and guarantees on quality and delivery performance.  OEMs still retained the 
design rights and possibly the manufacturing technology, leaving the supplier to optimise the 
manufacturing process. 
As these relationships developed the capabilities of the suppliers increased to the point 
where the OEMs started to question their own policy of internal manufacturing with each part 
or sub-system being evaluated against a make/buy decision matrix. As the OEMs reviewed 
increasingly more complex components a third and final relationship style developed. 
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The Risk and Revenue Sharing Partner (RRSP) developed out of the OEMs desire to “buy” 
more of the engine components and also to share the ever-increasing programme costs and 
risks with partners. In exchange for an entry fee a RRSP secures a percentage of the 
revenue generated by the programme whilst securing its position as a supplier for the life of 
the programme. This aligns the RRSP with the OEM giving common goals and benefits. It 
also strengthens the OEMs ability to compete to secure a position on a particular airframe as 
the OEM no longer has to find all the funding required to cover both the R&D bill and the 
entry fee now commonly demanded by the airframers. 
In an ideal RRSP relationship the partners share all risks and revenues and in doing have a 
transparent view of each others part in the programme they share. This utopia is not always 
achievable from a commercial perspective and leads to partial sharing relationships. OEMs 
may feel unable to share all details of the contracts with airline customers leading to partial 
sharing. Suppliers may be unable or unwilling to share in particular programme risks, again 
leading to a partial sharing relationship. 
There is not really a ”best” business model between the engine OEM and the 1st tier of the 
supply chain. The nature of these relationships changes dependant upon many factors 
including the OEM’s position with the airframer and the risk appetite each party to the 
agreements has. When times are hard for the engine OEM its desire for cash to fund its 
programme may out weigh the lack of risk transfer to the supply chain. As financial health 
becomes less important the premium paid by a supplier for access to the programme may 
change from cash to risk or a balance of the two. It could be argued that this balance is 
healthier as the relationship has greater alignment and the contract should become easier to 
manage. 
As with most risky environments, having a portfolio of relationship types is likely to be the 
safest approach and this can be demonstrated in the varying relationships seen between 
engine OEM and supply chain.  
 
7. 1ST TIER & NTH TIER SUPPLY CHAIN 
For the 1st tier supplier the relationship upwards in the extended enterprise value chain is 
quite simple. These companies get their demands from the OEM and they break them further 
down in the value chain to the Nth tier suppliers. 1st tier supplier is a company that has OEM 
companies as customers and a Nth tier supplier can be raw material supplier to a 1st tier 
supplier or a 1st tier supplier that delivers to another 1st tier supplier, then its called Nth tier 
supplier. 
In the aero engine business one company can be on different levels in the value chain 
depending what engine program and OEM it works for. An example can be that Volvo Aero, a 
1st tier supplier, serve the OEM Rolls Royce on a certain program and on the other hand in a 
different engine program for Rolls Royce  it can act as an Nth tier supplier to another 
company which acts as an 1st tier supplier to Rolls Royce 
The commercial relationship between the 1st tier supplier, engine OEM and airframer 
normally becomes a two way relationship rather than three way relationship. The 
requirements regarding new engine manufacturing from the OEMs are pushed down the 
extended enterprise value chain. Although to create relationship with airframers and airlines 
can create customer value and expand the business for the 1st tier suppliers. 
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In the aero engine aftermarket the situation is completely different, where even small shops 
need relationships with airlines, OEMs and other companies in the extended enterprise value 
chain. The complexity of the business model is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Business model diagram for 1st tier supplier with supply chain 
Success / failure 
1st and Nth tier suppliers must continually strive for workshare on the various OEM engine 
programmes. The main competitive factors for the 1st and Nth tier suppliers are environmental 
improvements (noise level), weight reduction, cost efficiency, ability to create relationship and 
financing.  
No one in the supply chain can solely develop engine parts that satisfy all environmental 
demands, therefore there must be system integration between the OEM, 1st and Nth suppliers 
to solve the environmental issues on a higher level. The tight integration between the 
companies in the value chain forces the companies to be very dependent on each other. The 
ability to create tight relationship with a winning partner is therefore a key to success. To get 
into a new program costs tremendous amount of money and what owner wants to spend 
money today that he/she might get back in 30 years. The need for financing is always an 
imminent issue.  
It is hard to develop unique knowledge (with little involvement from OEM) in the business. To 
be competitive on the 1st tier supplier level in the extended enterprise value chain the 
companies need to be good at creating customer value by handling weight reduction and 
cost efficiency. 
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Value Proposition 
For the 1st tier supplier there are several ways of doing business with the OEM. A full sharing 
risk and revenue sharing partnership (RRSP) contract includes design responsibility, 
hardware supply, product support and to be a service provider. There are very few contracts 
that consist of a full sharing contract, always some risk that are negotiated.  
The risk sharing element of a full sharing contract consists of sharing 100% program risk. 
The program risk involves fluctuations in engine price, exchange rate, customer credit risk, 
raw material escalation, volumes, deliveries and all activities involved with Nth Tier Supply 
Chain. The RRSP contract demands stability in the supply chain and it also creates more 
collaboration within the commitment. As a full sharing RRSP the supplier participates in all 
costs and revenues generated by the programme. As a result if the OEM provides engine 
maintenance and support through long-term service level agreements like TotalCare® or 
OnPointsm the supplier would share in the revenue received under those contracts. 
Partial sharing RRSP contracts are outlined differently for every customer and engine 
program. The starting point is a full sharing RRSP contract but some of the risk can be 
negotiated to be taken by the OEM. Examples of risk which that can be limited are 
concession fee, volume risk and material procurement. These customer adapted solutions 
give the 1st tier supplier less risk but also a lower possible revenue stream in the future. 
A Long-Term Agreement (LTA) is a contract where the OEM carries the programme risk and 
the supplier only takes the volume risk during the contract period. The Design authority stays 
with the OEM. Normally these contracts are very short, 5 to 10 years with possible break 
clauses, which give the rights to terminate after due date if they wish to do so. The main risk 
involved for the 1st tier supplier in these contracts is the volume scenario over the contract 
period. The OEMs are not really interested in these contracts on a higher level. The purpose 
of these contracts is more of outsourcing nature and the main target for OEMs the OEM is to 
compare cost/unit price and on time delivery. 
Similar types of LTA contracts are often also used in the value chain between the 1st & Nth 
tier supplier. It’s frequently used and the Nth tier supplier carries very little risk and the main 
goal is to offer the right price. Figure 9 indicates how the risk is altered by the business 
model. 
 
Figure 9. How the risk alters with the business model 
Customer Segment 
There are very few OEMs in today’s aero engine industry. Reasons for this are that very few 
companies are capable of integrating the power plant design with the airframe and the supply 
chain is very complicated; its more for technical than financial reasons. Even if the OEM 
makes all decisions regarding engine configuration and they handle all the integration 
towards airframe manufacturer they need partners, although it would be easier for the OEM if 
partners were not needed. The enormous competition between the OEMs forces the 1st tier 
suppliers to have very close ties and contribute with technology to OEMs. The high 
Full Sharing RRSP 
Risk level100% 0 % 
Risk adjusted RSP LTA
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competition between the OEMs pushes them to offer substantial concessions, which also 
affect the 1st tier suppliers. 
There are also other target customers for the 1st & Nth tier suppliers; Engine Module OEM 
and Engine Sub Partners. Some Engine Module OEMs can also act as 1st tier supplier to an 
OEM in a different program. An Engine Module OEM holds a share in the engine as an 
RRSP and uses 1st tier suppliers or sub partners, Nth tier suppliers, to manage their mission. 
Distribution Channels 
Many companies are using alliances and partnerships to position themselves on the market 
and to get closer to their customers. The number of aero engine manufactures is quite small 
and therefore to be a partner in the market you need to demonstrate a technological 
advantage. The first step to show new technology is to prove it in a demonstration program 
together with the OEMs and other partners.   
Several 1st tier suppliers also use joint development teams with other suppliers and 
relationship marketing on all levels to get into new programs. Continuing a successful 
relationship is a natural way of doing new business. The aero engine business today is very 
conservative regarding changing partners; the risk level increases when changing, and there 
is no need for change if the relationship works today.  
Customer Relationship 
Many 1st tier suppliers establish alliances and partnerships between themselves and the 
OEM’s. The initial contact for the relationship often starts during a demonstration program, 
where new knowledge is demonstrated, and it develops further when the RRSP-contract is 
signed. To work well, an RRSP deal requires a close relationship between the partners to 
solve all challenges during the program life; this gives many reasons for having frequent 
programme meetings. For the 1st tier suppliers these meetings can also be seen as a way of 
continuously having dialogues with the OEM in order to maintain the relationship. 
Value Configuration 
1st tier suppliers provide different customer solutions to different customers and many of them 
offer a wide range of hard and soft products. To be able to deliver a value proposition 
consisting of RRSP, design, hardware supply, support and service provision there must be 
activities and resources ready to support the offer. Design Management and Project 
Management are key activities that must be performed to be able to deliver hardware that 
meet customer requirements. Manufacturing Management, Service Management and Supply 
Chain Management are needed for supplying the part to the customer. Program 
Management involves taking care of the on-going business and the function helps the 
customer with all activities during program life. Program Management needs to work closely 
with Financial Management and Risk Management. 
Core Capabilities 
The value configuration shows the resources and activities needed to support a customer 
offer. The Core Capabilities are the ability to execute a repeatable pattern of actions that is 
necessary in order to create value for the customers. For 1st tier suppliers this means the 
ability to handle their own processes and deliver the demanded quality for Product 
Development, Manufacturing, Product Support, Logistics and Financial services. Developing 
new capabilities takes a long time and it must be proven to a certain technology readiness 
level before offering it to new engine customers. The strategic decision of the company 
decides which capability is prioritised and what components the company should offer the 
customer. 
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Partner Network 
A natural way to create a partner network is by taking part in the EU demonstrator programs 
which are very important for the 1st tier suppliers. In these projects OEM, 1st and Nth tier 
suppliers meet and contribute with their knowledge. Depending on the knowledge that is 
asked for in the project one company can offer manufacturing, material supply, engineering 
work or contribute with all activities in one package. To finance the different projects there is 
always a need for money, which can be funded with free cash within the business, from 
financial institutes or government loans.  
Cost Structure 
Development of new aero engines is extremely expensive and very few companies can carry 
out the complete investment by themselves. In a RRSP offer the main competitive factors are 
development cost and industrialisation cost; these costs are very high and require good 
finance solutions.  
Many 1st tier suppliers are working with different partner solutions regarding manufacturing 
which makes it easier to find an attractive cost for different components depending on the 
complexity of the part. Generally it is harder to find outsourcing opportunities for the 
developing phase than to find a “make to print” firm that can handle the manufacturing. 
In a full sharing RRSP all transactions are shared by all partners. This means that even if a 
1st tier supplier only contributes with product development and manufacturing it must take 
part of the whole program cost and revenue streams. Sharing all transactions limits the risk 
involved when only relying on sales figures for new manufacturing but the full sharing RRSP 
also includes transactions which today have a lower margin, such as overhaul. Examples of 
costs that a full sharing RRSP deal includes airframer costs, operator cost, overhaul cost, 
cost for spare parts, sales cost, finance cost, other miscellaneous costs and concessions. 
Revenue Streams 
Depending on contract type; revenue streams will look different for each program. An RRSP 
contract in today’s aerospace business gives a long payback time, perhaps 15-25 years. The 
risk involved with such a long pay back time are significant. For RRSP contract 1st tier 
suppliers get their revenue based on engine share, sometimes this includes OEM spare parts 
and sometimes it doesn’t.  
A Total Care deal involves all transactions and regarding revenue streams these come from 
airframers, operators, overhaul, spare engine sales and finance revenues. By taking part of 
all these revenues the 1st tier supplier buys certainty but reduces its return. It will get a less 
fluctuating cash flow curve over time. 
LTA gives the 1st tier suppliers a revenue stream based on volume sold multiplied by price 
per part. Investments such as engineering cost, tools, starting cost and other expenditures 
can either be included in the product price or received as a Non Recurring Cost (NRC). 
Financing research can sometimes be very expensive and sometimes governments can 
contribute with some funding to various projects. 
8. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
In completing this document it has proved difficult to develop comprehensive models for the 
business model at each tier of the value chain. From this it is evident that many of the actions 
of each partner are reactive to the upstream tier in the value chain. An example is the engine 
OEM, where the product offering to the airline is structured to respond to the exact 
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requirement of the airline. As such it may be considered that the business model is a position 
on a sliding scale.  
Some of the trends highlighted relate to the high competition and risks, high investment 
levels and long payback timescales required to be part of the value chain. High competition 
between OEMs has lowered the engine price, creating a reliance on the aftermarket for the 
OEM to achieve break-even. As such risks have increased and the OEMs have sought to 
offset these by sharing risks with key supply chain partners. The trend for risk-sharing leads 
to a situation where cash is essentially being borrowed from the lower tiers of the value 
chain. 
This lack of an identifiable and coherent strategy is perhaps indicative of the importance of 
this work, where in future deliverables for Tasks 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, the implications of current 
enterprise structures will be considered and proposals made for future developments. 
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